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“Watersheds come in families; nested levels of intimacy. On the grandest 
scale the hydrologic web is like all humanity. ... The big river is like your 
nation, a little out of hand. The lake is your cousin. The creek is your sister. 
The pond is her child. And, for better or worse, in sickness and in health, 




Basin-wide arrangements such as the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)2 are crucial 
to regulate specific regional problems.3 If effective, they are better placed to 
address the special peculiarities of a given hydropolitical region than are the 
general rules of international law.4 Conversely, general rules of international 
law could provide a general framework for basin states that need to negotiate 
the modus operandi of their respective access to common waters like the 
* LL.B (AAU), LL.M (UP), M.A (AAU), 
PhD Candidate, Melbourne Law School, 
The University of Melbourne, Australia. 
I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the 
sustained intellectual stimulation and 
encouragement of Ato Elias Nour, who 
not only closely followed up the progress 
of this article right from its inception 
through its completion, but also gave me 
his illuminating comments on an earlier 
version of this paper. 
 
1 Michael Parfit, quoted in Maude Barlow, 
and Tony Clarke, Blue Gold: The Battle 
against Corporate Theft of the World's 
Water (2002) xi. 
 
2 Launched in February 1999 in Dar Es 
Salaam, Tanzania, with all the Nile ripar-
ian but Eritrea as members, the NBI is a 
temporary mechanism through which the 
basin states would establish a basin wide 
treaty and institutional mechanism for the 
equitable and reasonable sharing of the 
common waters. It is expected to draft a 
basin-wide treaty binding upon all ripar-
ian states that establishes a Nile Basin 
Commission with powers to study and 
resolve conflicts over the utilization of 
the Nile waters. It operates from its head 
quarters in Kampala, Uganda.  
 
3 Basin-specific treaties complement and 
supplement the general rules of interna-
tional law regulating the use of interna-
tional watercourses. In cases of conflict 
between the two sets of rules, the basin-
wide treaty prevails through the legal 
maxim that special rules prevail over the 
general (lex spacaialis rule) and the gen-
eral rules give way to the special ones on 
the particular subject. See Philippe 
Sands, 'Watercourses, Environment and   
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Nile.5 As Hayward observed, ‘a clear view of the requirements of interna-
tional law can provide States with a reference point from which to assimilate 
the diverse influences that shape their  actions and interactions with their ri-
parian neighbours’.6 It is in the same vein that Art 3 of the 1997 UN Conven-
tion on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (Watercourse 
Convention) 7 is worded in such a manner that recognizes ‘the “framework” 
nature of the [Watercourse] Convention…[and it] encourages parties to fol-
low the general principles on the Convention in their specific agreements 
without preventing them  from departing from it.’8 
 
Yet, in the regulation of inter-state right and duties over common waters, in-
ternational law generally leaves much to be desired. Attempts to develop and 
elaborate rules of international law pertaining to the regulation of a state’s 
right to  utilization and management of international waters have been met 
only with a modest success in terms of codifying binding and universally ap-
plicable rules. It has been observed that ‘[i]nternational river law is one of the 
most unsettled areas of international law; it is an area where there are few 
rules of general application or validity.’9  The only convention that purports 
to have the potential of universal applicability in the regulation of inter-state 
non-navigational utilization of international waters to date is the Watercourse 
    the International Court of Justice: The 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case' in Salman 
M. A Salman, Boisson de Chazournes, 
Laurence (ed), International Water-
courses: Enhancing Cooperation and 
Managing Conflict: Proceedings of a 
World Bank Seminar (1998) 121. 
 
4 See R D Hayton, 'The Formation of the 
Customary Rules of International Drain-
age Basin Law ' in A H Garretson, R D 
Hayton and C J Olmstead (ed), The Law 
of International Drainage Basins (1967) 
862. 
 
5 See Stephen C. McCaffrey, 'A Human 
Right to Water: Domestic and Interna-
tional Implications' (1992) 5(1) The 
Georgetown International Environmental 
Law Review  18. 
 
6 Keith Hayward, 'Supplying Basin-Wide 
Reforms with an Independent Assess-
ment Applying International Water Law: 
Case Study of the Dnieper River' (2007) 
18(3) Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy 633. 
 
7 Convention on the Law of the Non-
navigational Uses of International Water-
courses 1997; Adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 21 
May 1997. The adoption of the Conven-
tion saw 103 states voting in favour, 3 
against (Burundi, China and Turkey) and 
27 abstain against it. See General Assem-
bly resolution 51/229, annex, Official 
Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-
first Session, Supplement No. 49,
(A/51/49); available at <http://
untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts /instruments/ 
english/ conventions /8_3 _1997.pdf >, 
last accessed 06 February 2008. 
 
8 Stephen C McCaffrey, and Mpazi Sinjela, 
'The 1997 United Nations Convention on 
International Watercourses' (1998) 92(1) 
The American Journal of International 
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Convention which has yet to enter into force as it is awaiting the necessary 
trigger- ratification.10  
 
Various general rules of international law  require specific basin or sub-basin 
agreements for their application.  In effect, the regulation of a state’s right to 
access the waters of an international river such as the Nile has been left to the 
bilateral or multilateral agreements among the riparians of a given water.  In 
the Nile Basin, such a regulatory framework is expected to result from the 
efforts of the NBI. Obviously, to date the NBI framework is more of a prom-
ise than an achievement as it has yet to establish a basin-wide treaty and the 
Nile Basin Commission. 
 
In the basin that has seen much more of discordance, unilateralism, mutual 
insecurity and suspicion as well as conflicts among the riparians rather than 
trust and cooperation, the establishment of the NBI in itself has appeared to 
throw up a beacon of light. A new dawn of rapprochement seemed to be on 
the horizon when the Nile riparian states declared that ‘there is no regional or 
international treaty or agreement among the riparian States of the Nile River 
Basin…on cooperation in the utilization of the waters of the Nile River Ba-
sin.’11  This declaration is of crucial significance as it marked, prima facie,  a 
break away from the hitherto prevailing stance of some riparian (notably 
Egypt and Sudan) that insisted on the continued validity of some colonial and 
postcolonial treaties and their extended application to non-state parties of the 
Nile Basin riparian. Although Egypt and  Sudan did not expressly renounce 
the validity of the status quo, the embodiment of the principle of equitable 
utilization of the Nile in NBI’s declaration implies a departure from the status 
quo which did not recognize the equitable share of upstream riparians.   
 
Yet there seemed to be a retreat from this stance and an apparent change of 
heart among the lower riparians. Of late, Egypt and Sudan have come up with 
the proposition that the status quo of the existing uses be respected, in a man-
ner that adversely affects the interests of upper riparians. The official reason 
for this change of stance has been attributed to the two downstream states’ 
fear of possible threat to ‘their water security’, who proposed to insert a 
clause in the draft instrument for the maintenance of the same. According to 
the Chair of the Nile Council of Ministers, Egypt and Sudan have insisted on 
the recognition by the other Nile riparians of the 1929 treaty between the UK 
9 Yimer Fisseha, 'State Succession and the 
Legal Status of International Rivers' in 
Ralph Zacklin, et. al. (ed), The Legal 
Regime of International Rivers and Lakes 
(1981) 177. 
 
10 Thirty-five states should ratify the Con-
vention for it to come into operation. See 
Watercourse Convention, Art. 36 (1) and 
(2). 
11 See Nile Basin Initiative Act (2002), Pre-
amble, Para 2. 
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(acting on behalf of Sudan) and Egypt.12  Where the situation stands now, the 
move towards basin-wide framework and the establishment of the Nile Basin 
Commission within the NBI has hit a temporary glitch, casting doubt over the 
immediate prospect of reaching a final framework agreement over utilization, 
management and protection of the waters of the Nile. Such an attitude, it will 
be shown, is never an isolated incident, as similar motives and actions have 
provided roadblocks to the conclusion of an agreement over the equitable 
sharing of the Nile waters over the past decades.  
 
This paper argues that three barriers must be overcome for the ongoing NBI 
efforts to take off the ground: legal paucity, obsession with history and doc-
trinal wranglings. In the next three sections, the paper grapples with these 
three barriers in that particular order. In the two sections that follow, the role 
of basin-specific arrangements and the special role of the NBI will be pre-
sented. It will be argued that states have the duty to negotiate in good faith to 
reach basin-wide agreements. Finally, conclusions and brief recommendatory 
notes have been forwarded.  
 
1 The State of International Law Regulating Inter-state Water 
Rights  
 
Analysis of the rules of international law over the management, utilisation 
and development of transboundary river basins such as the Nile leave one in 
a penumbra of doubt as to whether there are specific rules capable of resolv-
ing the apportionment of the shared waters. Apart from the Watercourse Con-
vention which is yet to become operational after the necessary number of 
ratifications, rules of international water law have ‘always been (and remain
[..]) vague and uncertain.’13 Except for a few principles such as the principles 
of equitable utilisation, the no-significant harm rule, and the duty to negotiate 
in good faith that emerge from customary rules (see section 6 below), general 
12 Joseph Ngome, Daily Nation, ‘‘News 
Extra: Clause Holds Key to New Nile 
Treaty’, Nairobi, Kenya, 28 March 2008; 
available at <Nationmedia_com>, last 
accessed 28 March 2008. Information 
pertaining to the negotiation process and 
its progresses are hardly available as the 
dialogue is surrounded by a cult of se-
crecy. 
 
13 See  Lucius Caflisch, 'Regulation of Uses 
of International Watercourses' in Salman 
M. A Salman, Boisson de Chazournes, 
Laurence (ed), International Water-
courses: Enhancing Cooperation and 
Managing Conflict: Proceedings of a 
World Bank Seminar (1998) 316;  Ellen 
Hey, 'Sustainable Use of Shared Water 
Resources: The Need for a Paradigm 
Shift in International Watercourses Law' 
in Gerald H Blake, et. al. (ed), The 
Peaceful Management of Transboundary 
Resources (1995)  127-130; Dante A 
Caponera, 'Shared Waters and Interna-
tional Law' in Gerald H Blake, et. al. 
(ed), The Peaceful Management of 
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positive international law has to travel a long distance before declaring itself 
ready and able to regulate inter-riparian allocation of water resources . 
 
This lacuna points to the heightened importance of basin-specific treaties and 
mechanisms that should be installed. For example, the basin states of the Ni-
ger, the Senegal, the Zambezi river basins and the SADC Protocol have  trea-
ties and mechanisms to enforce cooperation among the riparians. In contrast, 
the Nile Basin States have not entered into any formal permanent arrange-
ments concerning their dividend from their shared water.14 Saving the dual 
exceptions of the 1929 and the 1959 treaties between Sudan and Egypt, all 
the bi-lateral and multilateral agreements over the waters of the Nile failed to 
apportion the bounty of the river among the riparians.15 Almost all of the co-
lonial treaties were concluded with the sole aim of freezing upstream projects 
over the Nile, in order to secure a continuous and undiminished flow of the 
water to Egypt. Consensus now exists that colonial agreements over the Nile 
have no legal effect whatsoever.16  
 
There has never been a treaty that has brought together all the riparians of the 
Nile. It is indubitable that ‘currently, there is no regional or international 
Treaty or Agreement among the riparian States of the Nile River Basin.’17 
This has left the basin without any comprehensive regulatory framework 
wherein an anarchic situation looms large, a scenario that inevitably perpetu-
ates the hitherto prevailing unilateralism. Thus, the ongoing negotiation is all 
too important for the purpose of establishing a cooperative atmosphere in a 
basin where unilateralism, inter-state competition and mutual suspicion have 
been the norm while joint management and cooperation over the common 
resource have been exceptions. The crux of the analysis, then, is that the ba-
sin states would go some way towards the conclusion of a Nile basin treaty if 
they bring themselves to terms with the fact that the colonial treaties on the 
14
 Valentina Okaru-Bisant, 'Institutional and 
Legal Frameworks for Preventing and 
Resolving Disputes Concerning the De-
velopment and management of Africa's 
Shared River Basins' (1998) 9(2) Colo-
rado Journal of International Environ-
mental Law and Policy 348-349. 
 
15 For an excellent  discussions of the chro-
nology and current status of the  Nile 
basin treaties, see generally  Okon 
Udokang, Succession of New States to 
International Treaties (1972); O Okidi, 
'History of the Nile and Lake Victoria 
Basins through Treaties' in P P Howell, 
and  J A Allan (ed), The Nile: Sharing a 
Scarce Natural resources-A Historical 
and Technical Review of Water Manage-
ment and of Economic and Legal Issues 
(1996) 
 
16 See ‘The Nile: Water Conflicts’ < http://
www.scienceinafrica. co.za/ 2003 /may /
nile.htm> , accessed 08 April 2008; See 
also generally Girma Amare, Nile Issue: 
The Imperative Need for Negotiation on 
the Utilization of Nile Waters, EIIPD 
Occasional Papers Vol.2, No.6 (1997). 
 
17 The Nile Basin Initiative Act (2002), 
Preamble, Para 1 
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Nile waters are of no legal significance and that general international law 
cannot go down to the extent of apportioning shared waters such as the Nile.  
It is such an awakening that would pave the way for a constructive negotia-
tion that helps start from a clean slate in view of inaugurating a comprehen-
sive Nile Basin treaty and institutional mechanism  for the equitable appor-
tionment of the common resource 
 
2. Divorce from the Past: The Role of Colonial Treaties and 
Colonial Mindset  
 
History of inter-state interactions in the Nile basin is replete with repeated 
and overlapping efforts of the European colonizers to bring the river under 
their respective sphere of influence aimed at achieving their imperial objec-
tives. Thus reference to the past, though important, does not offer much to-
wards the harmonization of inter-riparian attitudes in their interactions and 
joint search for a cooperative framework over the Nile issue. Arguably, there-
fore, some of the colonial mentalities and traits of colonial motives have re-
mained behind after the departure of the colonial masters, and it is still appar-
ent in the inter-state negotiations over the use of the Nile waters such that 
these traits continue to hamper joint efforts towards the conclusion of a basin
-wide treaty regime. 
 
Historically, the Nile was part and parcel of the colonial scramble for Africa 
particularly because of the realization that control of Egypt and the Suez Ca-
nal by colonial administrations depended heavily upon the possibility of con-
trolling the Nile.  
 
[t]here are about ten agreements dealing with consumptive use of the waters 
of the Nile and Lake Victoria.  Prior to World War I, the treaties show Great 
Britain, for Egypt, as the contracting state. The United Kingdom, then the 
administering colonial power over Sudan, concluded an agreement with It-
aly (1891), Ethiopia (1902), the independent State of Congo (1906), and 
with Italy and France (1906). There is further agreement with Italy, signed 
by Britain, in 1925. Since then, Britain and Egypt signed all agreements on 
the Nile waters, beginning with the 1929 agreement dealing with Egyptian 
rights generally vis-à-vis those of Sudan, and ending with the agreements 
for construction and maintenance of the Owen Falls Dam achieved by Ex-
change of Notes between 1949 and 1953.18 
 
Notwithstanding Belgian control of Burundi, Rwanda and Congo (now De-
mocratic Republic of Congo (DRC)), Ethiopia’s independence and Italian 
control of Eritrea, Great Britain had effectively controlled the Nile River 
18 Okidi, note 15 above, 323. 
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from its origins to the Mediterranean Sea.19 Although Britain had used every 
possible means it had at its disposal to achieve the full control of the Nile, the 
more diplomatic avenue of concluding international treaties with the only 
independent state in the basin at the time (Ethiopia) and European powers 
controlling some of the then colonies provided an effective device towards 
that end. The most striking feature common to all the colonial treaties signed 
by Great Britain was the fact that in all the treaties the protection and further-
ance of Egyptian interests (and colonial interests in Egypt) were the primary 
consideration. 
 
It may not be that Great Britain intended so much to protect Egyptian inter-
ests per se as it did to protect its own colonial ambitions. For one thing, no 
colonial power like Great Britain could have failed to take note of the value 
of Egyptian Red Sea ports that were of central importance to Britain’s colo-
nial trade. Thus, during the colonial period, the ‘Nile waters continued to be 
the lifeline of British colonial economic interest same as they had always 
been for Egypt.’20  For another, the Suez Canal commanded a central strate-
gic importance for controlling the shortest route from Europe to India- the 
‘Jewel of the British Crown’.  Besides, the colonial policy of exploiting the 
huge Egyptian cotton productions for the textile mills in England was contin-
gent upon Egyptian political stability. As Elhance noted, ‘[t]o a very large 
extent, this stability  became contingent upon satisfying Egypt’s growing wa-
ter needs, without much regard for the interests of the other riparian.’21  
 
This colonial policy was also prompted by the desire to manipulate the Nile 
waters in order to soften the anti-colonial uprising in Egypt.22 The British 
were pretty much aware of the fact that unless they control the Nile waters, it 
would have been impossible to put pressure on Egyptian nationalism that was 
on the rise against the colonial rule.  As  Yacob Arsano noted,  while Britain 
acted as a provider of the Nile waters to Egypt, ‘it was naïve to believe that 
the British were dying for Cleopatra’s Egypt, but the former was using 
Egypt’s most sensitive resource to soothe the anti-British nationalist anger in 
Egypt since the end of the First World War’.23 By 1923, this policy was for-
mulated in an unequivocal manner: ‘The power which holds the Soudan (sic) 
has Egypt at its mercy and through Egypt can dominate the Suez Canal.’24 
Such considerations had been behind the lopsided colonial agreements per-
19 Arun P. Elhance, Hydropolitics in the 
Third World: Conflict and Cooperation 
in International River Basins (1999)  68. 
 
20 Yacob Arsano, Ethiopia and the Nile: 
Dilemmas of National and Regional Hy-
dropoitics(Unpublished,  PhD Disserta-
tion, The University of Zurich) (2004) 
53. 
21 Elhance, note 19 above, 68 
 
22 Yacob, note 20 above, 54. 
 
23 Yacob Arsano, 'Towards Conflict Pre-
vention in the Nile Basin' (Paper pre-
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taining to the utilization of the waters of the Nile. In the words of Yacob 25 , 
‘Britain made sure that all Nile related agreements benefited its own colonial 
interests.’ It was almost inevitable, therefore, that the multitude of the colo-
nial agreements that Britain initiated and concluded with the upstream actors 
‘were far from establishing a regime of reciprocal rights or providing shared 
benefits on the transboundary water resources.’26  
 
The striking similarity of all the colonial agreements lies in the fact that they, 
rather than establishing basin wide regulatory frameworks, established prece-
dents and informed postcolonial mindset of riparian states whose behaviour, 
at least partially, are modeled on the colonial era approach to the problem, 
and that continued to hinder fresh negotiations and agreements upon the equi-
table utilization of the Nile. 27 The treaties of the colonial era in most cases 
banned irrigation, power generation and other uses of the Nile waters without 
the prior agreement of the Egyptian government in order to ensure the con-
stant unreduced flow of the waters to Egypt.28 Besides, these treaties encour-
aged unilateralism rather than cooperative management of the common re-
sources; indeed, the utilization of the Nile waters depicts a marked difference 
between the rhetoric of the river being common to the riparian while remain-
ing private to Egypt and Sudan. As observed by Kinfe, ‘[t]he British stance, 
in more sense than one, represents the early embryo of unilateralism which 
still bedevils the relationship among the riparians in general and that of 
Ethiopia and Egypt in particular.’29 
 
Notwithstanding the departure of the colonizers and the attainment of inde-
pendence by the former-colonies of the Nile basin, , the colonial era mental-
ity is still refusing to give way to the post independence situations, as it is 
still lingering only to aggravate the long standing injustice relating to the 
utilization of the bounty of the Nile.  The Egyptian leaders, beginning from 
the time of Nasser, adopted the concept of ‘water security’ from the British 
who had stated: ‘No one can hold Egypt securely unless he also holds the 
    presented at the 5th Nile 2002 Confer-
ence, 1997) 491. 
24 John Murray, British Foreign Minister 
Bureaucrat, in his Memorandum on the 
Political Situation of Egypt, quoted in 
Terje Tvedt, “The Management of Water 
Irrigation: The Blue Nile” in Beyond 
conflict in the Horn of Africa (1992) 186. 
25 Yacob, note 20 above, 53. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Y A Mageed, 'The Integrated River Ba-
sin Development: The Challenges to the 
Nile Basin Countries' in J Lundqvist, U 
Lohm and M Falkenmark (ed), Strategies 
for River Basin Management (1985)  
155. 
28 Ibid, 151. 
29 Abraham Kinfe, 'Nile Hurdles: Psycho-
Political Roadblocks to An Agreement 
and the Way Forward toward A Rap-
prochement' (2000) Occasional Papers 
Vol.2, No.6 (Ethiopian International In-
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whole valley of the Nile.  The sources of the river in hostile or even in indif-
ferent hands must always be a grave cause of danger.’30  
 
Whereas the post independence era has witnessed only one treaty- the 1959 
Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters- concluded between 
Egypt and Sudan, this treaty has proved, like its colonial era predecessors, to 
be nothing more than a continuation of the colonial policies. It is only anoma-
lous for two downstream states with extremely marginal water contribution to 
the Basin, if not none, to agree for ‘the full utilisation’ of a river originating 
in and shared by eight other states. Like its colonial predecessors, it was 
aimed to protect the Egyptian, and, to a lesser extent, Sudanese interests. Like 
the colonial era treaties, it did not give any consideration to the interests of 
the other riparians that are equally entitled to the utilisation of the waters of 
the Nile.  Tesfaye has rightly asserted:  
 
Ever since the signing of the 1959 Agreement Egypt had time and 
again showed its inflexible stance towards the alteration of the 
treaty. …It [Egypt] rather considers the 1959 and preceding agree-
ments as unchanging and sacrosanct. In effect, in as far as Egyp-
tians are concerned, any fresh talk on the Nile water utilization be-
yond the 1959 status quo must by all means be circumvented. Put 
another way, the bottom line to any talk and the resultant modus 
vivendi, if any, should first and foremost take the 1959 status quo 
for granted and rather discuss the possibility of acquiring additional 
water in the Nile Basin. 31   
 
As recently as March 2008, Egypt and Sudan maintain that the framework 
agreement that has been drafted by the NBI should include a clause that 
reads: “[n]ot adversely affect the water security of current users and rights of 
the Nile Basin countries.”32 It has been reported that the water security of 
current users referred to here is the uses established under the 1929 and 1959 
treaties between Sudan and Egypt.33 Where the situation stands now, admitted 
the NBI, the disagreements have presented a significant hitch to the NBI 
processes and it needs the intervention and negotiation by the political heads 
of the states to expedite the process.34  
 
 
30 Peel, quoted in Kinfe Abraham Kinfe, 
'The Nile Issue: Psycho-Political Hurdles 
to an Agreement and the Way Forward 
Toward a Rapprochement' (Paper pre-
sented at the 5th Nile 2002 Conference, 
1997) 599. 
31 Tesfaye Tafesse, The Nile Question: Hy-
dro Politics, Legal Wrangling, Modus 
Vivendi and Perspectives (2001) 79. 
32 See Daily Nation, note 12 above 
(emphasis added). 
33  Ibid. 
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Yet, it needs no mention of the fact that the two treaties bind only the parties 
to them: -Sudan and Egypt- and should basin wide treaties be agreed, an en-
tirely different document is needed that is based on a new equilibrium of eq-
uitable and reasonable utilisation.35 The fact that new uses are of equal im-
portance as existing uses cannot be overemphasised. Thus the post independ-
ence (1959) agreement and the attitude of some of the riparians in the ongo-
ing NBI process proved to be a continuation of the colonial era mentality 
wherein the Nile was presumably geared almost exclusively towards the ful-
filment of interests of Egypt (and Sudan) .Thus the postcolonial mindset of 
some of the riparian states  is a close imitation of that of the pre-
independence period that has served as a strong precedent upon which the 
Egyptian and Sudanese  leaders modelled their post decolonization  (1959) 
agreement on the Nile.  
 
It is just axiomatic, therefore, that the ‘colonial era mentality, subsequently 
inherited by the rulers of independent Egypt [and Sudan], and the resent-
ments it has generated in the newly independent nations have continued to 
circumscribe hydropolitics in the Nile basin in the post-World War II era.’36 
As a result, the ‘current management of Nile waters is one based on the views 
articulated by British imperial interest in the first half of the twentieth century 
which were … based on the assumption that Egypt’s interests were para-
mount.’37 Insistence upon the continuity of the prevailing situation would 
inevitably mean that the interests of the upstream Nile basin states would 
continue to play second fiddle to those of the downstream states. Such an im-
balance has bred an impasse that has been hindering fresh negotiations over 
the allocation of the bounty of the Nile.  
 
3. Resolving Doctrinal Controversies 38 
 
International law has been suffering from fluidity as regards the rules appli-
cable to the consumptive utilization of international rivers. Against the back-
drop of such ambiguity, the Nile riparian states have locked horns in their 
adherence to contradictory doctrines, the choice of which has heavily de-
34 Ibid.  
 
35 Okaru-Bisant, note 14 above, 331.  
 
36 Elhance, note 19 above, 69. 
 
37 J.A Allan, 'Nile Basin Water Manage-
ment Strategies' in The Nile: Sharing a 
Scarce Natural resources-A Historical 
and Technical Review of Water Manage-
ment and of Economic and Legal Issues 
(1996) 316. 
38 It is beyond the purpose and scope of this 
work to delve into the details of the doc-
trinal controversies revolving around 
riparains’ rights over shared water re-
sources. For the present purposes, the 
intention is to show that arguments 
emerging from varying theories have 
contributed not in bringing the Nile ripar-
ians together but have worked to set them 
apart.   
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pended on political expediency.  Needless to say, certain doctrines have be-
come obsolete.  But the tendency of adherence to them by Nile Basin states 
presents an obstacle that stands in the way of the formation of a new Nile Ba-
sin treaty. Of the various doctrines known to international law, two theories 
deserve a brief revisit here.  
 
3.1- The Theory of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty/ The 
Harmon Doctrine 
 
The theory follows from the assumption that a state is a master of all persons, 
things and circumstances existing in its territory. Accordingly, a state may 
adopt any measures relating to that segment of the waters flowing on its terri-
tory and freely dispose of the resource.   In so doing a state consults and is 
guided only by its own national interests. In its bare form the theory advo-
cates that ‘an international watercourse situated in the territory of a State con-
stitutes part of the public domain of that State and that since a State has   do-
minium over its territory, another State acquires rights thereon only with the 
agreement of the first State’.39 
 
Historically, the theory was authoritatively stated for the first time by Judson 
Harmon, Attorney-General of the United States, in a declaration of 1895 con-
cerning the disputes over waters of the Rio Grande River between United 
States and Mexico.  Invited to give his opinion on the position of the United 
States on the question of whether the United States was obliged to let flow to 
Mexico parts of the waters of Rio Grande which were diverted upstream, At-
torney-General Harmon gave his famous statement: 
 
The fundamental principle of international law is the absolute sovereignty 
of every nation, as against all others, within its territory… . All exceptions 
… to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories 
must be traced to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no 
other legitimate source.  … . The immediate as well as the possible conse-
quences of the right asserted by Mexico show that its recognition is en-
tirely inconsistent with the sovereignty of the United States over its na-
tional domain. … The case presented is not a novel one. Whether the cir-
cumstances make it possible or proper to take any action from considera-
tions of comity is a question which does not pertain to the Department [of 
Justice]; but that question should be decided as one of policy only, be-
cause, the rules, principles, and precedents of international law impose no 
liability or obligation upon the United States.40  
39 Bonaya Adhi Godana, Africa's Shared 
Water Resources: Legal and Institu-
tional Aspects of the Nile, Niger, and 
Senegal River Systems (1985) 32. 
40 Quoted in Stephen C. McCaffrey, The 
Law of International Watercourses: Non-
Navigational Uses (2001) 115. 
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This strong statement has provided the genesis and the strength for the theory 
of absolute sovereignty.41 The consequence of the theory is that it allows up-
stream states a complete freedom of action with regard to that segment of 
international watercourses flowing within their territories, irrespective of any 
prejudice it might entail in other countries downstream.  That the theory is 
favourable to upper-basin states and, where there are several of them, to the 
uppermost one needs no further comment. It is not surprising therefore that 
Ethiopia’s aide-memoire of 23 September 1957 addressed to diplomatic mis-
sions in Cairo seems to incline towards this theory although it did not cate-
gorically adhere to it.  In fact, the following aide-memore was a reaction to 
Ethiopia’s exclusion from the negotiation process between Egypt and Sudan.   
 
Ethiopia has the right and the obligation to exploit the water re-
sources of the Empire…for the benefit of present and future genera-
tion of its citizens…[and]…must, therefore, reassert and reserve 
now and for the future, the right to take all such measures in respect 
of its water resources and, in particular, as regards that portion of 
the same which is of the greatest importance to its welfare, namely, 
those waters providing so nearly the entirety of the volume of the 
Nile, whatever may be the measure of utilization of such waters 
sought by recipient states situated along the course of that river.42  
 
At the UN Water Conference held in Argentina (in 1977), Ethiopia pro-
nounced that it is ‘…the sovereign right of any riparian state, in the absence 
of an international agreement, to proceed unilaterally with the development 
of water resources within its territory.’43 Although this statement sounds 
stronger than its real content, it does not articulate absolutist utilization in 
disregard to lower riparians.  
 
The theory of absolute territorial sovereignty has not been received well by 
state practice or by publicists. Foremost opposition comes from downstream 
states in many parts of the world whose right to the international waters will 
be sacrificed to the extent of the validity of the theory.  So too, the great ma-
jority of writers emphatically reject the theory of absolute territorial sover-
eignty or the Harmon Doctrine and no support for the doctrine can be found 
in contemporary literature.44 Support for the theory from judicial practice is 
also next to none.45 Indeed, the theory is ‘almost unanimously abandoned 
today’.46  In the context of the Nile basin, it has yet to be unanimously re-
 
41 McCaffrey, note 40 above, 113.  
42 Quoted in Godana, 39 above, 35-36 
43 Clarke, quoted in Yacob,  Supra note 19   
at 55. 
 
44 Godana, note 39 above, 36; McCaffrey,    
     note 40 above, 123. 
45 Godana, note 39 above, 36. 
46 Ibid, 38. 
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nounced by the riparian states. Nevertheless, the Nile riparian states’ unani-
mous declaration that they seek ‘to achieve sustainable socioeconomic devel-
opment through equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile 
Basin water resources’47  seems to be a move towards the renunciation of the 
doctrine. 
 
3.2- The Theory of Absolute Territorial Integrity 
 
This theory is the polar opposite of the absolute territorial sovereignty doc-
trine. While the latter advocates an upper riparian’s complete freedom of ac-
tion in relation to international waters, the  theory of absolute territorial in-
tegrity maintains that the upstream state may not do anything that might af-
fect the natural flow of the water into downstream state. According to this 
theory, therefore, upper riparians of a river that start to develop their water 
resources more slowly than lower riparians of the river will be seriously af-
fected as they will be prohibited from undertaking any activity that would 
seriously affect the flow of the river to a state or states downstream. 
 
Indubitably, this theory has been espoused and advocated by downstream 
riparian states. The fact that life in Egypt has been totally dependent on the 
waters of the Nile for millennia prompted Egypt to claim that it has 
‘historical’, ‘natural’ or ‘acquired’ rights.   Such a claim is to find its roots in 
the theory of absolute territorial integrity. According to Girma,   
 
The Egyptians, and to a lesser extent the Sudanese, favour the prior use 
doctrine, also known as prior appropriation doctrine which provides that 
‘the first user of the water acquires a definitive right to it, “first in time, 
first in right”.’48  
 
For fear of the possibility that Ethiopia and other upper riparians may begin 
to construct projects that would reduce the amount of water flowing into Su-
dan and Egypt, the two lower most riparians hold to this doctrine in order that 
the upstream states remain prevented from using the waters. The doctrine is 
premised on the fact that the lower riparians have long put the Nile waters to 
their use before the upper riparians have, and, as a result, have acquired 
‘historic rights’ thereon. In Erlich’s view, there are dual moral dimensions to 
Egypt’s ‘historic rights’: ‘first, Egypt has no other option to survive; and, sec-
ond, Ethiopia has lived without the Nile so far and presumably can do so in 
47 See Preamble, The Nile Basin Initiative Act, 2002, available at < http:// www. nile-
basin.orgindex.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=8>, Para 2,  accessed 
05 April 2008 (emphasis added).  
48 Amare Girma, 'Nile Issue: The Imperative Need for Negotiation on the Utilization of 
Nile Waters' (1997) Occasional Papers Vol.2, No.6 (Ethiopian International Institute 
for Peace and Development, EIIPD) 8. 
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the future’.49 It would come as no  surprise that the doctrine of absolute terri-
torial integrity, and its corollary, ‘historic rights’, has therefore been advo-
cated foremost by lower- most riparian Egypt compared to any other riparian. 
But it is too much to assume that the moral dimension of the argument will 
lead to legal right.  It has been observed that: 
 
[t]he Egyptians’ legal argument for their exclusive rights to the Nile waters 
is founded on precedence: Egypt has always used the waters of the Nile 
without restriction. …Moreover, they argue, the idea …was confirmed by 
the international agreements signed during the twentieth century. The princi-
ple of historic rights was mentioned in the 1929 Egyptian [British]-Sudanese 
Water Agreement and reiterated in the agreement for the Full Utilization of 
the Nile Waters of 1959. In fact, Egyptian (and Sudanese) exclusiveness 
with regard to the Nile waters was recognized by the British in all their colo-
nial agreements.50 
 
As Egypt has always been sensitive to the possibilities of development of the 
Nile by upstream states, its adherence to the doctrine of absolute territorial 
integrity had remained unchanged over the years. As far back as 1925, during 
the meeting of the Nile Commission, Egypt expressed its adherence to the 
theory of absolute territorial integrity on the division of the waters of the Nile 
among the riparians.   More than five decades later, in 1981, Egypt expressed 
its unchanged stance in its ‘Country Report’ at an interregional meeting of 
international river organizations held in Dakar. The Report argued: 
[e]ach riparian country has the full right to maintain the status quo of the 
rivers flowing on its territory… it results from this principle that no coun-
try has the right to undertake any positive or negative measure that could 
have an impact on the river’s flow in other countries. … a river’s upper 
reaches  should not be touched lest this should affect the flow of quantity 
of its water.51  
 
Like the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty, the theory under con-
sideration has been a subject of severe criticisms. It is extremist in es-
sence and myopic in orientation.  As Godana noted, ‘the essential ineq-
uity of this theory resides in the fact that it allocates rights without corre-
sponding duties.’52 Neither state practice, nor the practice of international 
or domestic tribunals nor the writing of publicists has sufficiently sup-
ported this theory.  Political statements aside, even Egypt has not been 
consistent in practice in its adherence to the theory. Suffice for the present 
purposes to mention that Egyptian agreement of 1949 to projects in upper 
Nile countries, such as the Owen Falls Dam in Uganda, which is a huge 
49 Haggai Erlich, The Cross and the River: 
Ethiopia, Egypt, and the Nile (2002) 6. 
 
50 Ibid. 
51 Quoted in Godana, note 39 above, 39. 
 
52 Godana, note 39 above, 39. 
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departure in practice from the theory of absolute territorial integrity.53 
Thus the theory, like its opposite, has gone out of favour, and ‘may now 
be considered as discarded.’54  
 
Nevertheless, it is odd to witness that insistence on this theory seems to be at 
the roots of the recent deadlock created in the NBI wherein Egypt and Sudan 
insisted upon the inclusion of a provision that has the import of maintaining 
the status quo of prior appropriation of the Nile waters by the two down-
stream states.55 That would have made the whole NBI efforts a futile exercise 
at best.  Such a stance in itself is a bottleneck to the formation of any basin 
wide agreement among the riparians, but most importantly, it has played a 
knock-on effect by enticing the upper riparians to pay in kind. According to 
Yacob, adherence to the theory by downstream states of the Nile Basin has 
provoked the upper riparians to hold to a counter stance, wherein they hold to 
the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty over the waters flowing in 
their territories.56 As stated earlier, Ethiopian position was unambiguously 
enunciated at the UN Water Conference held in Argentina in 1977 in which 
Ethiopia pronounced the ‘… sovereign right of any riparian state, in the ab-
sence of an international agreement, to proceed unilaterally with the develop-
ment of water resources within its territory.’57  We may, however, consider 
this statement as a declaration which amplifies an aspect of the theory of eq-
uitable utilization because it has the basic theme of claiming equitable share. 
 
3.3- Current Trends towards Equity 
 
As the two doctrines highlighted above are in frontal clash with each other, 
any direct, indirect, total or partial adherence thereto in negotiations on the 
optimal utilization of the Nile can only set the countries apart rather than 
bring them to a point of agreement.  Although the respective validity of the 
doctrines in terms of the contemporary practice of states and of international 
law has been called into question,  the position of the Nile riparian have been, 
at least in theory, locked in these irreconcilable doctrines, and as such their 
contribution in hindering a negotiated agreement cannot be ignored.  
 
The doctrine of equitable utilisation made its appearance in the vocabulary of 
many of the riparian states of the Nile Basin only in recent past, but it may 
well be said, to use the usual catch-phrase, better late than never.  Granted, it 
is hoped that this new trend would provide a framework from which to work 
towards equity among the basin states in their respective rights and duties in 
the utilisation of the Nile waters.  
53 McCaffrey, note 40 above, 131. 
54 Godana, note 39 above, 39. 
55 See Daily Nation, note 11 above. 
56 Yacob, note 19 above, 55. 
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4. Back to the Future: Towards an Equitable and Reasonable 
Utilisation 
 
4.1 Introducing the Concept 
 
The principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation of common water re-
sources is the pillar of inter-state interaction over the uses of international 
waters.58  Predicated on the sovereign equality of states, this theory seeks to 
ensure to all basin states an access to a reasonable and equitable amount from 
the shared waters, but it also imposes the duties upon all riparian states to use 
the resource in an equitable and reasonable manner.59 It is crucial to stress 
that at the heart of the principle of equitable utilisation is co-riparian states’ 
‘equality of rights,’60  which means that riparian states have an equal right to 
use the common water resources in accordance with their needs.61   
 
It does not necessarily imply volumetric equality of shares. As Goldberg ob-
served, ‘[e]quality of rights does not mean in this context the right to an equal 
division of the waters but rather that each riparian has an equal right to the 
division of the waters on the basis of its needs, consistent with the corre-
sponding rights of other co-riparians.’62  Simply put, the principle of equita-
ble utilisation rejects the exclusion of any riparian from the use of a common 
water resource, while providing for parity of treatment of equally pressing 
national needs of all the co-riparian states.  
 
The actual dividend of a riparian from the common river thus turns upon 
multiple objective factors.  According to Lipper,63 three general criteria must 
be applied for an equitable apportionment of the actual share of a riparian 
state:  
a) examination of the economic and social needs of the co-riparian states 
by an objective consideration of various factors and conflicting ele-
ments relevant to their use of the water; 
58 See Keith Hayward, 'Supplying Basin-
Wide Reforms with an Independent As-
sessment Applying International Water 
Law: Case Study of the Dnieper 
River' (2007) 18(3) Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and 
Policy 633 642.See also Salman M. A. 
Salman, and  Kishor Uprety, Conflict and 
Cooperation on South Asia's Interna-
tional Rivers: A Legal Perspective (2002) 
15. 
 
59 Godana, note 39 above, 50. 
60 Jerome Lipper, 'Equitable Utilization' in 
A H Garretson, R D Hayton and C J 
Olmstead (ed), The Law of International 
Drainage Basins (1967)  44. 
61 Ibid. 
62 David Goldberg, 'World Bank Policy on 
Pojects on International Waterways in 
the Context of Emerging International 
Law and the Work of the International 
Law Commission' in Gerald H Blake, et. 
al. (ed), The Peaceful Management of 
Transboundary Resources (1995)  155. 
63 Lipper, note 60 above, 45. 
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b) distribution of the waters among the co-riparians in such a manner as to 
satisfy their needs to the greatest extent possible; and 
c) accomplishment of the distribution of the waters by achieving the maxi-
mum benefit for each co-riparian consistent with the minimum of detri-
ment to each. 
 
It is of paramount importance to stress that the application of the principle 
of equitable utilization is a process that heavily reposes on the amount of 
confidence among riparians.  Indeed, it is ‘a dynamic process, which de-
pended heavily upon active cooperation between states sharing freshwater 
resources.’64  Such a cooperative atmosphere among riparians results 
from knowledge of, inter alia, data and information concerning the water-
course and its provision of prior notification to other states of new uses 
that might affect them.65  
 
Be that as it may, the equitable utilization theory is also contingent upon 
other objective and specific factors. Under the 1997 Watercourse Conven-
tion, an illustrative (non-exhaustive) list of seven relevant criteria is pro-
vided:66 
a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and 
other factors of a natural character;  
b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned; 
c) The population dependent on the watercourse in each Watercourse 
State;  
d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one water-
course State on other watercourse States;  
e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse 
f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the 
water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken 
to that effect; 
g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular   
planned or existing use. 
 
At this juncture, it is important to note that there is no preferential treatment 
attached to the order of provisions of the criteria listed under Art 6 of the Wa-
tercourse Convention.  One criterion can be the most important consideration 
in one context while other criteria may take precedence over the others in 
other circumstances. The bottom-line is that a factor (criterion) must indeed 
be relevant as an aid in the determination or satisfaction of the social and eco-
nomic needs of the co-riparians of the basin. Once this threshold is met, it is 
not possible to attach a fixed weight to a singular criterion in all cases.  The 
relative weight of a given relevant factor turns upon its merits relative to all 
the other factors at a given point in time.67 In the final analysis, ‘no other fac-
64 McCaffrey, note 40 above, 345. 
65 (Id: 343). 
66 See Art .6 (1) (a-g). 
67 See Water Convention, Art 6 (3). 
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tor occupies a position of pre-eminence per se with respect to any other fac-
tor.’68 Some factors may even be irrelevant in a given scenario at a given time 
for the determination of a case at hand.69 Under the Watercourse Convention 
‘all relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on 
the basis of the whole’70 in the determination of what is a reasonable and eq-
uitable use in a particular case. Additionally, the Watercourse Convention 
clearly guards against temptations to attach a special weight to a given use,71 
and provides that in cases where conflict of uses occurs among the riparians, 
it instructs to attach ‘special regard…to the requirements of vital human 
needs,’72 presumably drinking and sanitation. 
 
Apart from its codification in the Watercourse Convention, the principle of 
equitable utilisation enjoys an overwhelming support of scholarship and state 
practice such that ‘nearly all international accords regarding international riv-
ers are based on this principle.’73 The 1966 Helsinki Rules (although not 
binding 74 and the 1994 International Law Commission’s Draft Articles (non-
binding) 75 had already solemnly espoused the principle before its eventual 
incorporation into the Watercourse Convention. Historically, the theory of 
equitable and reasonable shares has been recognized in China and India for 
many centuries and has acquired prominence over the past 500 years with the 
development of the nation state.76  It seems that the principle of equitable and 
reasonable use is part of international custom.77 As such, its inclusion in Art 5 
of the 1997 Watercourse Convention is a codification of international custom 
rather than a progressive development of rules of international law regarding 
non-navigational uses of international watercourses.78  
 
Notwithstanding earlier debates as to the applicable theory in the Nile basin, 
there seems to be a change of heart among the riparian states. In their recent 
68 C J Olmstead, et al, 'Helsinki Rules on 
the Uses of the Waters of International 
Rivers' in A H Garretson, R D Hayton 
and C J Olmstead (ed), The Law of In-
ternational Drainage Basins (1967) 779 
785. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Art 5 (3). 
71 Art  10 (1). 
72 Art 10 (2). 
73 Erlich, note 49 above, 7. 
 
74 See ‘ The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of 
the Waters of International Rivers,’ 
Adopted by the International Law Asso-
ciation at the fifty-second conference,  
held at Helsinki in August 1966, Art IV. 
75 See ‘Draft Articles on the Law of the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, Arts 4 and 5. 
 
 
76 Erlich, note 49 above, 7. 
 
77 See Richard Paisley, 'Adversaries into 
Partners: International Water Law and 
the Equitable Sharing of Downstream 
Benefits' (2002) 3 Melbourne journal of 
international law 280283. 
 
78 It must be noted that the (1997) Water 
Convention explicitly states that it is an 
embodiment not only of progressive de-
velopment of international water law but 
also of codification of an exiting custom. 
See Preamble, Water Convention, Para 4. 
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statements, an Egyptian diplomat and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister, have stated 
their adherence to the theory of equitable and reasonable utilization of the 
waters of the Nile.  The statement of Egyptian former Ambassador to Ethio-
pia, Marwan Badr, given on 7 August 1998 is instructive in this regard: 
 
Egypt recognizes that each state has the right to equitable utilization of its 
waters in accordance with international law. Egypt further recognizes that 
existing water agreements do not hinder the utilization of the Nile waters 
by any of the riparian states.79  
 
This theory has been well received in Ethiopia as well.  This can be dis-
cerned from the recent statement of the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles 
Zenawi: 
 
What we basically need is to deal with the Nile basin as a single region with 
shared natural resources. If we take this as a basis for dealing with the Nile 
issue, we will be able to devise better ways to achieve the maximum benefit 
from its waters.80  
 
The biggest merit of the theory is that it takes into account both the current 
and future water needs of the riparians and is elastic enough to accommodate 
changing set of circumstances.  A state’s regime of utilization that is equita-
ble vis-à-vis its co-riparians today may not be so next year. As McCaffrey 
noted, a ‘new use in one state may change the equitable calculus as among all 
riparians and therefore should be the subject of notification, consultation, and 
if necessary, negotiation. And this is true whether the new use is made by an 
upstream or downstream state… .’ 81 
 
4.2 Variants of Equitable Utilisation: Towards Application 
 
Conceptually it is important to distinguish between two variants or modes of 
application of the principle of equitable utilization. The shared uses variant 
refers to the classical apportionment method, and it is usually achieved 
through a treaty among the basin states that allocates the dependable flow of 
wet water of a river among the riparian states, where right to ‘water qua wa-
ter’ is created.82 But each state enjoys complete freedom of action with re-
spect to the choice of the manner of utilization of its quota,83 presumably, 
with the major caveat that no state can have the right to cause a significant 
harm to its neighbors through its usage of the common waters. 
79 Quoted in Robert O Collins. ‘The In-
scrutable Nile at the Beginning of the 
New Millennium’ available at < http://
www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty /
Inscrutable %20 Nile1.pdf.>, accessed 
16 December 2007(emphasis added.).  
80 Ibid. 
 
81 McCaffrey, note 40 above, 345. 
 
82 Wolf Quoted in A Dan Tarlock , and 
Patricia Wouters, 'Are Shared Benefits of 
International Waters an Equitable Appor- 
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The second variant of equitable utilization, called shared benefits principle, 
springs from welfare economics, and its gist is that water is a scarce resource 
that can be put to alternative uses but that in water sharing processes among 
the riparians of a given water states must ensure that water is put to a use that 
is most valuable as compared to the other uses.84 The implication in many 
cases would lead to a situation where ‘some nations forgo the actual use of 
wet water but are entitled to monetary compensation for allowing other states 
to put the water to its most efficient use.’85   
 
In the NBI discussions, references have been made to the principle of equita-
ble utilization but it yet to be seen if the states are ready to commit them-
selves to the shared benefits variant of the principle. Indeed, the NBI itself 
started off with a participatory process of dialogue among the Nile riparian 
states that resulted in their agreeing on a shared vision—to ‘achieve sustain-
able socioeconomic development through the equitable utilization of, and 
benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources.’86 
 
Due to the usage of the word ‘benefits’ in the NBI processes, it is instructive 
to make an overview of the advantages and demerits of the two variants. At 
one level, the difference between the two variants appears to be little more 
than semantics. It could be argued that the object of any equitable distribution 
of  an international river being to ensure that all riparian states receive ‘water 
justice’, and since ‘water justice’  can be obtained equally by sharing the use 
of wet water or by monetary compensation, the dichotomy is a distinction 
without a difference.87 
 
Yet, such a line of argument comes out of a lack of deeper insight into prob-
lems associated with the practical application of the two variants of the prin-
ciple. It may be pointed out that at least three concerns are associated with 
the ‘shared benefits’ variant of the principle.88 Firstly, upstream headwater 
states are usually less fortunate than the usually wealthier downstream states, 
and such is the case in the Nile Basin. As a result, they may be tempted into 
accepting short-term benefits at the expense of forgoing their future uses.89 
Secondly, shared benefits may not directly address problems of poverty alle-
viation, and they usually fail to benefit those in the watershed of origin.90   
    tionment?' (2007) 18(3) Colorado Jour-
nal of International Environmental Law 
and Policy  526. 
83 Ibid, 526-527  
84 Ibid, 527. 
85 Ibid, 527 
86 See ‘NBI Background’, < http://
www.nilebasin.org/index.php?
option=com_ content &task =view 
&id=13&Itemid=42>, last accessed 05 
April 2008. (Emphasis added.). 
87 Tralock and Wouters, note 82, above, 
527. 
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Thirdly, benefit sharing runs the risk that aquatic ecosystem integrity may not 
be adequately addressed, and the bio-system of the basin may be negatively 
affected.91 The problems, as they are, may not be insurmountable but they 
must be carefully addressed. It can only be hoped that the ongoing negotia-
tion over the cooperative utilization of the Nile waters will carefully address 
these and other related concerns. 
 
4.3 Equitable Utilisation vis-à-vis No-significant Harm Rule 
 
The principle of equitable utilisation and the ‘no-significant harm’ rule have 
been vying for recognition for a long time. Normally, the interplay of the 
doctrines of equitable utilisation and that of preventing ‘significant harm’ in 
the utilization of common waters are presented as a warring company. His-
torically, the no significant harm rule emerged before the principle of equita-
ble utilisation. It regulated a whole range of neighbourly relations, especially 
transboundary harms attributable to the commission or omission of a 
neighbouring state.  
 
The origin of the ‘no harm rule’ may be traced to the Roman law maxim: sic 
tuo utere ut alienum non laedas (use your property in such a way as not to 
harm others).92 It was originally based on the concept of restrictive enjoy-
ment of one’s own property, or limited and regulated proprietary rights sub-
ject to the prevention of harm to one’s neighbours.93  Put in the context of 
inter-state relations, it implied that neghibouring states ‘are not allowed to 
use or to tolerate the use of their territory for causing damage to their 
neighbours.’94  
 
Contrary to the rule of ‘no-significant harm’ which aspires to regulate the 
overall relations of neighbouring states, the principle of equitable utilisation 
is limited in scope to the regulation of inter-states’ non-navigational activities 
on international watercourses.95 Indeed, its emergence was prompted by the 
limitations of the ‘no-significant harm’ rule in relation to allocation of inter-
national watercourses. The ‘no-significant harm’ fails to provide adequate 
rules for the resolutions of controversies over ‘allocation issues on fully-used 
or over-used international watercourses, or would have done so in an [un]
equitable way…by giving complete priority to existing activities and by pro-
hibiting the development of new or the extension of existing uses.’96 
91 Ibid. 
92 Sompong Sucharitkul, 'State Responsibil-
ity and International Liability in Transna-
tional Relations' in Jerzy Makarczyk 
(ed), Theory of International Law at the 
Threshold of the 21st Century: Essays in 
Honour of Krzysztof Skubiszewski (1996)  
289. 
93 Ibid. 
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According to Caflisch, the no-significant harm rule has strived to play two 
related roles pertaining to the law of international rivers.97 First, it seeks to  
provide guidelines in the allocation of the rights of shared water basins, and, 
second, it is also of crucial relevance in the area of environmental protection. 
While it has continued to hold sway in relation to environmental considera-
tions, its water allocation utility has waned in recent years.98 This is because 
most international water basins are fully used or overused today and an at-
tempt at a new use by a riparian state would result in causing harm to the ex-
isting uses. The effective result of this no-significant harm rule is to maintain 
the status quo.  Considered in the context of the Nile basin, where the water 
is already fully used and new upper riparian attempt to put the waters to im-
minent new uses,99 the application of the ‘no-significant harm’ rule  would 
deny the upper riparians any possibility of developing or expanding their use 
of the Nile waters.100 
 
It was such a shortcoming associated with the no-significant harm rule that 
has brought into focus the need for clarification of the interplay of this doc-
trine with the principle of equitable utilisation. It is sterile to state that the 
prevention of any harm in a basin such as the Nile where ten states share the 
common waters is a matter of impossibility. The question that poses itself is 
as to which one of the two – the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisa-
tion or of no significant harm rule-takes precedence in the event that the two 
happen to contradict each other.   
 
In situations where an upstream state commences a new project that would 
otherwise be a reasonable and equitable use of a common international river, 
the new use upstream would almost inevitably result in the reduction of the 
quantity or quality of the water that flows downstream. Such a reduction 
would inevitably cause harm to the pre-existing uses of the downstream state 
by diminishing the quantity or quality of the water owing to the new up-
stream use. 
 
Under the doctrine of equitable and reasonable utilisation, the fact that there 
had been prior uses made of the common waters by some of the riparian 
would be one of the considerations in arriving at the equitable and reasonable 
allocation of the common waters. A use by a riparian may cause harm to the 
pre-exiting uses by another riparian. A choice must be made between the ap-
plications of the two competing principles.  
97 Ibid, 12. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ashok Swain, 'Managing the Nile River: 
The Role of Sub-Basin Co-Operation' in 
Manas Chatterji, Saul Arlosoroff, and 
Gauri Guha (ed), Conflict Management 
of Water Resources (2002) 145146-152. 
 
100 Caflisch, note 13 above, 13. 
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Historically, the need for clarification of the interplay of the two principles 
arose much earlier in the context of the 1966 Helsinki Rules.  Thus the Inter-
national Law Association considered that ‘the principle of equitable and rea-
sonable utilization should be the guiding principle… [wherein the no-
significant harm] rule was one among the series of elements to be considered 
for determining whether a given use was “equitable and reasonable”.’101 
 
It has been observed that there exists unanimity of opinion among scholars 
that, in the event of conflicts among principles, ‘the most fundamental princi-
ple of international water law is that of equitable utilisation.’102 In short, the 
principle of equitable utilisation takes precedence over the no significant 
harm rule. If it were otherwise, the resultant situation would be to freeze the 
development of many upper riparian states to international basins, and this is 
perhaps more so in the Nile Basin than anywhere else. An immediate result 
of the precedence of equitable and reasonable utilisation over the no-
significant harm would be to lay to rest the ‘prior appropriation’ doctrine that 
has been overly emphasised by the lower riparians of the Nile basin.  Thus, 
the rules of international water law do not approve of downstream states’ 
foreclosure of upstream new projects by demonstrating that the later develop-
ment would cause it harm.103  
 
During the preparation of the draft of what was to later become the Water-
course Convention, the International Law Commission commented that: 
 
[prima facie], utilisation of an international water course is not equita-
ble if it causes other watercourse states appreciable harm. … The Com-
mission recognizes, however, that in some instances the achievement of 
equitable and reasonable utilisation will depend upon the toleration by 
one or more watercourse states of a measure of harm.104 
 
Applied alongside with the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation, 
thus, the no significant harm rule imposes the duty of due diligence on the 
riparian states that start to put the common waters to a new or more use than 
had been the case. The due diligence duty goes beyond requiring a state to 
abstain from causing a harm to the other riparians and includes a positive 
duty to ‘take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant 
harm to other watercourse States.’105 It has been observed that events that 
should be prevented in a state’s territory could be lawful activities in the par-
101 Caflisch, note 13 above, 13. 
102 Stephen C McCaffrey, 'The Law of In-
ternational Watercourses: Some Recent 
Developments and Unanswered Ques-
tions' (1989) 17(3) Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy  509. 
103 Ibid. 
104 See Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its Forti-
eth Session, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
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ticular state’s territory, but suffice for it to cause the state’s international li-
ability so long as they entail a significant harm in a neighbouring state. In the 
end, everything boils down to the requirements of mutual empathy among the 
riparian and the search for ‘glasses half-full’.106 There is a compelling need to 
maintain a delicate balance, and departure to either end from such an equilib-
rium is equally prejudicial.  
 
5. Back to Point of Departure: The Water Convention and 
Basin-Specific Arrangements    
 
The analysis of the interplay of the principle of equitable and reasonable utili-
sation and the no-significant harm rule would take us back to our initial ob-
servation that much has to be achieved via basin-specific arrangements such 
as the NBI.  The rules of general international law provide general frame-
work within which basin-specific rules can be made. But, given the adher-
ence of the states to polarised positions, and the concern for sovereignty be-
ing still at play, it would take a long time for general international law, not 
least the Watercourse Convention, to play a major part in the resolution of 
water allocation in the Nile Basin. Indeed, some have doubted whether the 
Watercourse Convention would ever become truly operational.107  
 
The adoption of the Watercourse Convention has seen an expressed suspi-
cion, and even rejection, from the Nile riparians. Ethiopia complained of the 
lack of balance between the rights of downstream states and those of up-
stream states, and retorted that the Working Group that drafted the  Water-
course Convention had made ‘no serious desire to accommodate’ the interests 
of the upstream states, ‘particularly [those of] …a developing country such as 
Ethiopia.’108 Rwanda pointed out that the Watercourse Convention lacked 
regard for sovereignty which it considered a ‘sacrosanct principle’ in treaty 
making processes.109 Burundi outrightly rejected the Watercourse Convention 
and voted against it alongside China and Turkey. Egypt, Ethiopia, Rwanda 
and Tanzania have abstained in the voting process and have not signed it to 
date.110 The Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, and Uganda were absent 
and did not vote, and have not acceded to the Watercourse Convention subse-
105 Art 7 (1), Watercourse Convention.  See 
also Sucharitkul, note 92 above, 289. 
 
106 I borrow this phrase  from Elias N Ste-
bek, 'Eastern Nile at Crossroads: Pres-
ervation and Utilization Concerns in 
Focus' (2007) 1(1) Mizan Law Review  
58. 
 
107 Caflisch, note 13 above, 16. 
108 Aaron Schwabach, 'The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of Non-
navigational Uses of International wa-
tercourses, Customary International 
Law, and the Interests of Developing 
Upper Riparians' (1998) 33 Texas Inter-
national Law Journal  275-276. 
 
109 Ibid, 276-277. 
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quently. The only two Nile basin states that voted in favour of the Water-
course Convention were Kenya and Sudan, and their ratification is yet to 
come. That leaves the Nile basin in a desperate situation where any inter-state 
regulatory framework is utterly absent.   
 
Consequently, the hope of establishing a legal and institutional mechanism of 
inter-state cooperation over the management, utilisation and development of 
the Nile waters almost entirely depends on the success of the NBI processes. 
A regulatory framework that is specific to the basin states should soon be put 
in place and an effort to that end must tackle a huge task of balancing differ-
ing conceptions of sovereignty, the competition between equitable and rea-
sonable utilisation and the no-significant harm rule and the apportionment of 
common waters for current and future uses of the riparians which in turn de-
mands the accommodation of competing priorities of the Nile Basin states. 
Achieving such an objective is a task of monumental proportions but much 
depends upon the level of political will to avoid mutual suicide.  
 
6. Towards an Attitudinal Change: The Duty to Negotiate in 
Good Faith 
 
The attitudes of the Nile riparian states depict unique features that are con-
tributing to the anarchic state of affairs in the Basin. The White Nile riparian 
states are known for their reticence and ambivalence in the move towards a 
negotiated agreement over Nile waters utilization. Until recently, their par-
ticipation in the negotiations has been minimal . 
 
This attitude is attributable to a variety of factors.  The upstream states of the 
White Nile contribute just a modest share to the  Nile, and the consequent 
gains from the agreed legal frameworks that may come about may seem of 
minimal significance to them than to  the lower riparian and upstream states 
of the Blue Nile. Thus they may not have much incentive to spend much re-
source in the search for a negotiated agreement. Their relatively lesser de-
pendence on the waters of the White Nile basin might lie behind such states’ 
behaviour as well.  Located as they are in the humid equatorial zone with a 
relatively reliable rainfall and water sources outside the Nile basin, the equa-
torial riparians have, to date, a minimal dependence on the waters of the 
Nile.111 Besides, the gains that would accrue to them (from a basin-wide 
agreement) are so uncertain that they were not hitherto willing to risk their 
relationships with Egypt.112   
 
110 See The African Water Page < http://www.africanwater.org/UNPressWater.htm>, last 
accessed 08 April 2008. 
111 Tesfaye, note 31 above, 99. 
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Eritrea, a late comer as the newest state in the Basin, maintains an observer 
status to date, and is not actively committed to the NBI process. The major 
Blue Nile upper riparian and major contributor of the waters of the Nile, 
Ethiopia, has for a long time been a partner without a voice. It maintained an 
observer status both in Undugu and TeccoNile. To use comments from one of 
the external assessors of this article “UNDUGU was an informal forum 
spurred by Egypt which sometimes raised issues (regarding the Nile at the 
foreign ministers meeting of the OAU” while Hydromet and TECCONILE 
were the formal cooperative forerunners to the NBI.  
 
Egypt has always sought to ‘dominate rather than coexist with the Nile Val-
ley.’113 It almost invariably has always preferred the ‘do-it-alone’ avenue 
than concerted efforts to develop the basin waters. The construction of the 
Aswan High Dam, completed in collaboration with Sudan, seems to present 
an exception, but even that was a project constructed to serve more of Egyp-
tian interests than those of the Sudanese. Egypt saw the importance of using 
Sudanese land along the common border to build the dam close enough to be 
monitored and controlled from the Egyptian side. As is well known, the 
catastrophic human cost of the dam in the form of forced evictions of indige-
nous populations from their ancestral land on which the Aswan High Dam 
was built was borne almost solely by Sudan. And in part, it was partly a pro-
ject they imposed on the only other partner (Sudan) that was in a weaker bar-
gaining position then as it is now.  
 
To date, Egypt is known for its propensity to resort to armed responses to 
perceived or real hydraulic works on the Nile that would in the slightest way 
reduce the amount of waters reaching the Aswan. Thus the internal attitude of 
the countries of the basin is marked either by one of indifference, mutual in-
security or silence and this variation in the levels of enthusiasm for basin 
wide framework encourages the maintenance of the status quo and unilateral-
ism.  
 
It must be stressed that there are rules of international law that require a state 
to negotiate in good faith with the aim of reaching an agreement.114. In the 
negotiations of water basin agreements, failure to negotiate in good faith, or, 
alternatively, obstructing the move towards the negotiated legal and institu-
112 Ibid.. 
 
113 Elhance, note 19 above, 75. 
 
114 See Watercourse Convention, Arts  3(5), 
4 (2), 8 (1), 17 (1) and (2); See also 
Stephen E. Draper, 'International Duties 
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ter Sharing' (1997) 123(6) Journal of 
Water Resources Planning and Man-
agement  348; Mohamed Sameh Amr, 
'Diversion of International Water 
Courses under International Law' (2003) 
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tional framework is in itself a culpable conduct. More importantly, such an 
obstructive conduct of a state would almost inevitably cause significant harm 
to other basin states. Moreover, it may lend a hand to unilateral actions of the 
common river and continue to breed mutual mistrust among the basin states. 
On all of these counts, all of the Nile Basin states can be considered suspects, 
and a change of such an attitude and the need for complete good faith in intra
-basin negotiations is long overdue. It would not be to assume too much to 
state that the current intransigence of the downstream riparians in the NBI 




As the old adage has it, when the elephants fight, the grass gets trampled.  
While states of the Nile basin have engaged in legal and doctrinal wrangling 
on the way to basin wide agreement, each day that passes before the treaty is 
ratified imposes a heavy but avertable  cost on the lives, economic, security 
and environmental wellbeing of a tenth of the African population that inhab-
its the Nile Basin. This paper presents a humble effort to identify the causes 
that hinder or slow down the process of treaty formation over the allocation 
of the Nile waters among the riparians. Obviously, misconception of these 
causes leads to misdiagnosis of the nature of the problem, which in turn leads 
to the mismatch of response that perpetuates conflict and suffering in the Ba-
sin. Such a situation is akin to picking ants from one’s body while standing 
on an anthill.  
 
This study has identified triple blockades that hamper the path to the basin 
wide agreement in the Nile Basin that the NBI has to deal with. The basin 
suffers from a legal ambiguity, doctrinal controversies and problems of good 
faith on the part of the states. It is with the removal of these obstacles that the 
NBI efforts would come to fruition in the establishment of legal and institu-
tional mechanisms and the eventual allocation of the Nile waters in an equita-
ble and reasonable manner. 
 
The impending treaty must be able to establish the substantive and procedural 
safeguards of the rights and duties of the states vis-à-vis other riparians of the 
basin. Sufficient and clear mandate must be entrusted to the Nile Basin Com-
mission that would eventually replace the NBI. Success or failure of the im-
pending treaty regime depends on the degree to which it incorporates clear 
guidelines and institutional arrangement for the resolution of disputes that 
may ensue from time to time. The impending treaty would do well, therefore, 
by making provisions that take into account, inter alia, the needs of each ri-
parian country, the yield of the river, current uses and new projects.  Much of 
the prospect of success of the NBI ultimately depends upon the political will 
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and good faith put in the transition through the temporary NBI mechanism to 
the permanent Nile Basin Commission. It must be acknowledged that the 
Nile riparians do not have viable alternatives to the joint management and 
equitable utilisation of the Nile waters, and the choice is one of sailing to-
gether or sinking together. Time is running out, and so is water. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
